For a long time the history of communist organizations was primarily written from a party or partisan viewpoint, influenced by topical questions and subjects; 1 the interpretation or judgements offered were closely linked to the political stance of the author at the time of writing. Even works of a later date and conforming to serious academic standards often came from authors who had experienced communism at first hand. Many of them had been forced to leave Soviet Russia after the revolution. In contrast, others were close to a Communist Party or belonged to disappointed adherents or dissidents of communism -"renegades", as the communist organizations were wont to label those they had expelled and vilified.
• Being suddenly afforded access to collections hitherto hermetically sealed led historians to ask themselves how they could process the flood of material in any meaningful way. Methodical problems also arose, as the access policy often led, in the initial phase, to a consolidation of the descriptive positivist approach. Due to the widespread and systematic practice within the Comintern to declare documents "secret", 8 it was to be expected that early investigations would centre around establishing the facts. However, the desire to find out "how it really was" turned out to be an illusion, notwithstanding the extensiveness of the new sources. In comparison to what historians had to rely on before, the documents released seemed to promise much. On the one hand, such pages come direct from the national sections or the power centre itself of the Communist International; 9 on the other hand, they usually deal with internal party matters which were not disclosed publicly at the time or, if brought to the attention of the specific Communist Party at all, only in increasingly sparing doses. All these documents, then, are marked by the omnipresent atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion cultivated in Comintern circles, especially from the late 1920s onwards. As a first step, any mention of oppositionist opinion was deleted. Subsequently, in the 1930s, all "deviations" were criminalized and prosecuted. These distortions of reality find their structural reflection in the text, the words of which often conceal more than they purport to say. Many documents are rather testimonials to the hostile imagery in the mind-set prevalent in the Comintern and Soviet leadership of the time than evidence about any one political viewpoint or the oppositional stance of any one party member. When carefully deciphered, however, such passages offer insights into the compulsion exerted on the party faithful to adhere to the codes and models acceptable to Stalinist organizations, into how the self was perceived and presented within an almost perfect system of surveillance. Documents of this kind demonstrate how memory forms and re-forms itself in a culture where the expurgation from memory is an essential part of autocratic power-consolidation.
It thus appears that the facility to approach archival sources with critical caution is needed all the more when working in the Comintern Archive. In order to tease sense out of these papers from a bygone age, it is of equal importance to possess innovative goodwill: experimenting with novel perspectives, formulating new approaches or rephrasing old ones. What is particularly needed is a sensibility for strange and foreign concepts borrowed from cultural anthropology, for example, or an eye for documentary evidence which shows how power relations were structured and transported. Sociological methods could explain how political groupings formed and performed, micro-historical tools may provide insights into the fine mesh of social intercourse, those employing gender categories into male-female relationships.
In the first flush of enthusiastic writing after the opening of the archives, the critical attitude to primary sources was often neglected, but the tendency to instrumentalize documents for party-political ends was rarely apparent. Dazzled by the treasures in this AH Baba cave-system full of dossiers, even historians who were experts in their fields often threw professional caution to the winds. The interest of the media in the fabulous secrets of the archival vaults was soon to dissolve the thin line dividing the writing of history from journalism. It is perfectly legitimate that journalists or historians working as such should have reacted promptly to this public interest in Soviet politics and history. Writing the results in a nonacademic style or how they are presented does not disqualify the journalistic approach per se. The floodlights of mass-media attention, however, gave birth to "investigative" historiography, and some academic historians were a party to the worst excesses of such investigations. One not particularly glorious example concerned a well-known Italian historian: in pirate-like fashion he sold a document on Togliatti he had found in the Comintern Archive to a mass-circulation magazine. The papers from Moscow were later exploited for purely political purposes in the run-up to an Italian election.
"Conspiracy theories" thrived as well, not least those dealing with "Soviet agents", a theme which fascinates the public and commercial publishers alike. 10 NKVD or the KGB.
12 In Germany, a dispute flared up in regard to the Moscow past of the prominent SPD politician Herbert Wehner. 13 Recently, an edition of documents on the history of the CPUSA provoked a controversy among historians. Some criticized the tone of the book, especially its emphasis on the party as an intelligence-gathering agency.
14 Finally, a very recent example is apparent in the debate about a book on Arthur London whose autobiographical novel L'aveu and the film by Costa Gavras made him a symbol for the victims of the show trials after 1945. Drawing on new documentary evidence, the historian Karel Bartosek tries to prove that London, as an apparatchik and a collaborator of the Czech Intelligence Service, was just as much a "culprit" as a victim of Stalinism.
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In the area of Comintern historiography, "archival intoxication" sometimes produced a return to trivial models of explanation which depicted "International Communism" and its organization, the Comintern, as the work of a destructive band of adventurers who had diverted Russian history from its "normal" course after 1917. Such highly coloured writing based on new documents is often packaged in historical accounts penned by professional writers or journalists. Exemplary in this connection is a book by Arkadi Vaksberg on the Comintern, in which the author, by drawing on extensive, highly interesting (but unspecified) sources, comes to conclusions which correspond to literary standards and not to those of serious historical scholarship. 16 19 The observation of secrecy regulations and the omnipresent suspicion surrounded Russian archives like an aura. Characteristically, the process of releasing such documentation is termed de-secretization. The manic practice, widespread in the Comintern, of maintaining strict confidentiality, is reflected in its ultimate form by the historian's race to be the first to disclose what the once "secretized" files contain. In the reading rooms a conspiratorial atmosphere reigns, and the researchers peruse the dossiers with a detective's scrutiny reminiscent of the NKVD operatives who read the same pages sixty years earlier..In this approach, the documents serve as "proof" and the historian makes the archives "confess" a secret history.
The trend to exploit the archival deposits for commercial purposes has waned in direct proportion to the drop in medial interest for events from the Soviet past. While this ensures that the historians concerned now have a less stressful life, 20 the decline in public curiosity came about just when access to important collections was restricted once more. their executed cadres rehabilitated by Soviet or Russian judicial organs. Writing history from the standpoint of the victim, filling out the "blank spots" in communist history, and reassembling biographies of the forgotten were research activities in this first phase. 22 This period coincided with the last year of the GDR's existence -between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. Numerous memoirs, which had often lain in locked drawers for years, were published, as were many articles on the history of the German Communist Party (KPD) and the Comintern. Documents released shortly beforehand in East Berlin or Moscow formed the material for these initial studies.
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PHASES AND DIRECTIONS OF HISTORIOGRAPHY
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It soon became clear to the authors of biographically-centred works that the culprit/victim dichotomy they had never questioned was now redundant. A closer look at the tangled network of the Stalinist terror system in the 1930s strongly suggested that the categories of "victims" and "culprits" had become blurred in their outlines and unsuitable as explanatory synonyms. Also now clear was the realization that the mechanical interaction between confessions (in the form of detailed autobiographies written for "the Party") and denunciations, once set in train, proceeded to endanger an ever-increasing circle of persons. Frequently, the informer too was engulfed by the inexorable process. 24 In these circumstances it is difficult to apportion personal "blame", or to maintain that the innocence of the "victim" is beyond doubt. "Crime and punishment", to use a literary metaphor, are terms which can contribute little to an analysis of the manifold relationships among communist emigrants and Comintern functionaries in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. In a second phase, research concentrated on single Communist Parties, whose archival material is usually in Moscow. Scholars found their "own" national section in the masses of papers; on the basis of such investigations 23 In the category "biographical sketches" (biographische Skizzcn) see Gyorgy Borsanyi, "Emo Gero. Aus dem Leben eines Apparatschiks", Jahrbuch fiir Historische Kommunismusforschung 1994 Kommunismusforschung (1994 34 Apart from additional information about events in communist history, in particular resolving the mystery behind apparently inexplicable positions taken up by one party or another, 35 progress has been made in the following areas: the organizational structure of the Comintern; the authority it possessed and how it wielded it; those individuals staffing leading positions in the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI). New insights were also gained concerning the power mechanisms permeating the world movement, the purges it initiated and the reign of terror which followed them. A biographical approach, examining how whole groups of functionaries or individual communists fared, proved to be the most valuable access for researchers. 36 Our lack of knowledge in this area was quite considerable; the factual data acquired in the last few years was urgently needed to proceed further. In the following pages we wish to deal with new findings in connection with the Comintern's structures and its officials, study the relationship between the Moscow centre and the periphery, and discuss how power mechanisms functioned within the global organization. Finally, we draw the reader's attention to ongoing debates and research desiderata.
The Comintern Apparat and its Cadres
At first, the framework of the international organization of communism became clearer. It was subsequently possible to describe the apparat in great detail, including the countless attempts to restructure it. The complex diagram of the Comintern's structure was gradually disclosed, providing an overview of an organization which was multifunctional, geographically widespread and changing its shape time and again. 37 and numerous committees, hitherto unknown, emerged from the documents. 38 Many functionaries, whether cadres or employees of the Comintern, regained their historical place in the scheme of things. Previously, only the most important leaders and the foreign staff of ECCI were identified with name and function. Now it is possible to examine who the staff employees were, what they did and what happened to them. The Communist International had, on average, approximately 400 persons on its payroll, but the number varied greatly over the years.
New data from the Comintern Archive, while disclosing new details on the size and tasks of various ECCI departments and subcommittees, also offers three important insights into the forms of organization ECCI took on at different stages. First, the reorganization of 1935 which introduced the centralization of administrative duties and placed the central bodies dealing with the national sections on a geographical basis (Landersekretariate) under the personal responsibility of prominent foreign communists (Togliatti, Marty, Gottwald, etc.). Second, the bureaucracy was subjected to new criteria of efficiency and performance, 39 and third, the syllabus of cadre education was decided and reorganized according to changing needs.
The pyramidal structure introduced after the 7th World Congress (1935) made it feasible to delegate most decisions to the pertinent committee on the respective hierarchical scale. In addition, the most important questions were taken up at the level of the Secretariats. The main benefit of this structural reform was that the ECCI leadership was freed from having to discuss matters of secondary importance. A further result was the general rise in the efficiency of the entire apparat. By examining documents made available of late we can now apprise ourselves of the degree to which the Comintern of the 1930s was managed according to quasi-entrepreneurial, market-oriented standards. Contradicting the self-image it projected (an idealistically motivated community of common interest), the Comintern was a concern run strictly on the division of labour, with concomitant rationalization practices to reduce its technical and administrative staff. Changes are also visible in the many attempts at reorganizing the apparat since 1926, or in the "think tanks" which suggested such changes. Discipline at the workplace was reinforced by introducing strict regulations to supervise punctuality, orderly work practices and productivity. Some of the control mechanisms, clocking in or out, for example, were reminiscent of Taylorist Cadre material emanating from ECCI's many school courses delineates how party members were drilled to be conformist party functionaries. How various institutions of the Comintern were employed to impart a system of Stalinist values has received much scholarly attention recently, in particular the development, aims, extent and financial costs of such schooling. 44 For years the only knowledge available on the Comintern's secret institutions of learning was to be found in memoirs, but now the original documents can be examined in full.
The "Centre" and the Periphery
In any historical examination of the Comintern as an organization to promote Soviet dominance, a key question centres around the relationship between the apparat in Moscow and the numerous national sections. Documents now accessible reveal concisely how the centralization and "russification" policies within the International made the sections increasingly dependent on Moscow. The mechanisms in play to impose conformity, especially in the period of "bolshevization" from the mid-1920s, were common knowledge to interested readers for many years. Specialists now know that the leeway allowed any one Communist Party was constricted further in the 1930s, on several levels and at an accelerating pace. Comintern headquarters accorded more competence to ECCI departments, while simultaneously usurping additional powers of decisions for its own Executive. Consequently, the influence of the Communist Parties on overall policy and their consultative role were restricted, as the only information 43 The thick dossier on Herbert Wehner, for example, was the foundation for Reinhard MUller's book, Die Akte Wehner. 44 which flowed from the Russian centre was that which the Comintern leadership considered to be in its own interest. Nonetheless, when appraising these new documents one should avoid the temptation of seeing the relationship between the Comintern and its national sections solely from a Moscow perspective; it would be a distortion to underplay the national role the parties played in the workers' and, consequently, in the national cultures of their own countries.
Still to be analysed is the extent to which ECCI shaped the politics of the parties in specific cases. Drawing on new material it is now possible to make definite statements about two examples often discussed in the historiography of the Communist International: the attempts to legalize the French Communist Party (PCF) under the conditions of German occupation in the summer of 1940, and the Salerno "about-turn" of the Italian Party (PCI) four years later. As regards the first example, it has emerged that extensive contacts between officials of the PCF and the German authorities in France were initiated by party functionaries, who were subsequently told to "back off" by the Comintern. 45 The svolta di Salerno concerns the change in tactics by the PCI carried through by Togiiatti after his return from the Soviet Union: a policy of national unity, including the willingness to enter Badoglio's government. Basing his arguments on documents found in the Comintern Archive, the Russian historian Mikhail Narinsky attempted to prove that Stalin himself had ordered this volte-face in the interests of Soviet foreign policy. 46 "The Salerno tactical about-turn was on Stalin's orders", so ran the headline in Corriere della sera shortly afterwards. In his critique, Aldo Agosti found fault with this onedimensional slant (overemphasis of the Moscow perspective) of Narinsky 's piece, but did not disagree that the change in policy would have been impossible without Stalin's consent. However, Agosti held that the decision reached by Togliatti happened to tally with Soviet foreign policy goals, so that the Salerno about-turn was as much Togliatti's concept as it was Stalin's. 46 Mikhail M . Narinsky, "Togliatti, Stalin e la svolta di Salerno", Studi storici (Roma), 35, 3 (1994) , pp. 657-666. This article, b y the way, is a good example of how the "hierarchization" of archival access operates in Russia. Narinsky, as Assistant Director of the Institute for World History in the Academy of Sciences, was obviously deemed high enough in rank to be allowed to quote from documents kept in the exclusive "President's Archive". The most important document for his study was not shown to him, however, forcing him to extrapolate indirectly. 47 Although the dependency of the national sections on the Soviet centre is underlined time and again by the new documents, the formula "orders from Moscow" does not do full justice to the complexity of these relations. Gradually bringing the national sections to heel by means of centralizing policies was not the work of ECCI alone; 48 in many cases this process was initiated and accelerated by single Communist Parties. Sharing a common political goal and being bound to Moscow on many levels, the national sections were inclined to view the centralization tendencies enforced by ECCI as appropriate and efficient measures, which they should promote in their own countries as well. 49 In order to understand what bonded Western European communists to their ideological home in Moscow, attention must be paid to the following areas: 1 the ideological-political nexus as a constituent part of a unified ideological architecture based on programmes agreed upon and common goals; 2 the structural nexus between centre and periphery forged by the International's highly centralized organization; 3 the personal nexus forged by the transfer of cadres from Moscow to the head offices of the Communist Parties in Western Europe; 4 the cultural attachment forged by an emotional and intellectual identity with a Stalinist "way of life".
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Power Mechanisms and Terror
Parallel to the shift in power upwards within the organization, the Comintern had to accede competence to outside bodies. How the outside interference was brought to bear is not yet altogether clear, mainly for two reasons. First, because it operated on the basis of personal contacts, especially those between Stalin and Dimitrov, as the excerpts from the latter's diary and other material recently published have shown. 51 Second, the loss of the Comintern's control over its own affairs was decisively influenced 48 Whereas the term "centre" is useful in illuminating the relations between the national sections and the Comintern apparat, it can lead to an optical deception: within world communism ECCI was a prominently placed authority, behind which, however, the growing influence of the CPSU in international communist affairs, and the power of the Soviet Union itself and its state apparatus lay hidden from view. 49 For a more detailed account see Brigitte Studer, "Zwischen Zwang und Eigeninteresse. Die Komintern der dreissiger Jahre als Machtsystem und Sinnhorizont", Traverse, 3 (1995), pp. 46-62. 50 These levels of adherence are discussed in Studer, Un parti sous influence. 31 Extracts from Dimitrov's diary were published in Sovershenno sekretno (Moscow), 12 (1990), pp. 18-20; Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, 4 (1991) 53 Historians writing on Soviet social history describe how the NKVD set up secret structures in industry and educational institutions. The secret police directed these units to collect "incriminating" information on individuals, and used such documents in the purges which followed. taking sides -neither the unambiguously guilty culprits nor their victims. Furthermore, the informer was also under constant observation and could face arrest and prosecution. This was often the case with those who had carried out the ominous "review" of cadres.
57 Such was the background, the prelude to the massacre of foreign communists in the Soviet Union from 1935 onwards, a theme which has always fascinated those researching into the history of communism. Focusing on this "Shakespearian" finale of the world movement, however, obscures the marginalized role accorded to the Comintern in its last years. What party courts liquidated in a crescendo of monstrous accusations was but the shadow of a global force, which once, not least as a welcome ally assisting the various factions battling for power in the Soviet leadership, was purported to function as the motor of world revolution. From the beginning of the 1930s the Comintern gradually lost autonomy, and the 7th World Congress marked the last stage on the road to political oblivion. 58 As mentioned earlier, at this last congress of the Communist International, Yeshov and Moskvin, leading figures in the secret police NKVD, were elected to ECCI. In the next three years they oversaw the liquidation of the Comintern apparat. This wilful destruction of the movement in terms of organizational structures and human life has been analysed in some recent studies. In particular, we are indebted to Russian historians for drawing our attention to the planned, but never realized staging of a fourth great show trial -this time against the Comintern elite. Communism and Stalinism, 3, 7-8 (1996) , pp. 53-71. In his polemical book about "Hotel Lux", the Russian journalist Arkadi Vaksberg also mentions this planned trial.
relations (OMS). Marked down for liquidation were also scores of political emigres. The plan fell through, it is surmised, because Pyatnitsky and others refused to sign the fantastic "confessions" put in front of them. Failure in this case can hardly be attributed to Stalin. He personally intervened in the "investigations", determining the verdict in advance and said as much to Dimitrov, the General Secretary of the Comintern: "Knorin is a Polish and a German spy [...], Pyatnitsky is a Trotskyite." 61 Bearing this in mind, it does not seem far-fetched to postulate that not only the Comintern's most important officials, but also the entire communist emigration in the Soviet Union was to be physically exterminated.
DEBATES AND RESEARCH DESIDERATA
A review of works published in the five years since Russian archival collections have become available to foreign and native Russian scholars reveals that the balance is not strictly positive. For example, the sudden cascade of new documents has reinforced a tendency which was always present in Comintern historiography: an undue emphasis on political history. Studies of the cultural and social milieus in which communists lived concentrate generally on the given national situation and rarely treat the subject on an international or Soviet level. A third shortcoming is that Comintern studies run parallel to Soviet studies but rarely intersect with them.
The Historian Does not Live From the Archive Alone
The sudden accretion of factual knowledge prompted for a time a school of writing which chose to portray the history of the Comintern primarily in chronological terms. Research was thus perceived to have fallen behind the approaches pioneered among French and, to a certain extent, among North American scholars of communist studies, namely the new questions, concepts, methods and findings presented by them when Soviet archives were still inaccessible. documents on the international level of Stalinist rule by drawing on tools from other scientific disciplines. They also applied a socio-historical approach to good effect, deriving valuable findings from many facets of social life in their native countries. French communism, above all, benefited from this problem-oriented method, and recovered the place in modern French history which was its due. Research projects of this kind investigated, for example, how the PCF was socially and politically anchored in French society and where, who voted for it, the social composition of its members and leadership, the language it used and how it communicated. Attention focused on the PCF as a social milieu, as a service enterprise.
63 Before Russian archives were opened such studies could be criticized for their narrow perspective: by portraying communism as a specific phenomenon in workers' everyday life, the political character of the movement was neglected, i.e. the ideological, organizational and financial dependence of the Comintern Sections on Moscow. Geoff Eley described this historiographical tendency as "history with the politics left out". 1979 ", Communisme, 1 (1985 The Russian Review, 45 (1986), pp. 385-394. research elsewhere. The difficulty is that, in treating communist history on a national, international and Soviet plane, various contexts have to be intertwined and different historical approaches taken into consideration. How can the history of communism be written as a social and cultural history without losing sight of its inherently political character? Or how can it be described in terms of power structures or the Terror of the 1930s without reverting to a one-sided, manipulative discourse? Western communists were neither will-less puppets on Moscow's strings nor did they live in self-sufficient national or regional cultures. If the historiography of communism and Stalinism is not to go into reverse gear, the interpretative models and methods behind the historical research of mentalities should not be used -as was the case when the archives remained closed -just to fill the holes caused by the lack of factual knowledge. In reality the problem is the opposite: it is precisely those approaches which emphasize social milieu and workers' culture that need to be underpinned by sufficient primary sources of a general kind. Theprerequisite material enabling wider empirical investigation only became available after 1991. Now it should be possible to fill out the "blank spots" in the international movements's history, and to depict it in all its diversity, with all its contradictions -as a unitary system which generated the suppression of its own cadres, but also acted in an integrative fashion world-wide. In the field of Soviet studies, a profound change of outlook took place before the archives opened their doors to the West. Instead of politological concepts about the "nature" of the Soviet system, expressed for decades in models of "totalitarianism", a series of historical studies of the Russian communist system appeared. Comintern historiography has yet to rum this comer. Indeed, the questions posed by scholars writing on the history of Soviet society seem more exciting than those formulated by Comintern experts. It is about time, we feel, for.Comintern studies to be integrated into the broad history of Stalinism or, as North American historians term it, the history of the "Stalin period".
The change in perspective away from "totalitarianism" was mainly the work of Stalinism experts in North America, known collectively as "revisionists". 66 The essence of the "revisionism debate" was the "historiciz- 67 Such new approaches heralded in a belated change of direction in studies of Russian or Soviet social history, or to use the North American appellation, "New History". 68 The theses of the "revisionists" provoked virulent reactions because of their eminently political implications. The fire of the "revisionists" was directed at the "totalitarianism" paradigm hitherto uncontested in North American universities, against the predominant role of analysis which was designed for immediate political consumption and printed in journals like Soviet Studies. 69 What the revisionists "revised" was the model, assembled by political scientists, of a totalitarian Soviet state, which towered as an absolute, monolithic system above a society which had been formed by communist ideology and kept in place by the use of mass terror. The revisionist counter-argument was that the Soviet state, if at all, could only then be termed "totalitarian" by virtue of the intentions it held, especially as everyday life was characterized by the chaotic incompetence and uncoordinated measures of government agencies. Further, the Terror, supposedly directed from a central base, proved on analysis to have been neither uniform nor thoroughgoing. The "revisionists" were at pains to demonstrate that the dynamics of social antagonism, seen as part of society's development in those years, provided the key to the sense behind the Terror. For many who read the treatises of the "revisionists", the Terror seemed to have lost many of its daemonic attributes and "irrationality". Furthermore, Stalinism was not only a "Revolution from above" (Robert Tucker), but contained elements of a "Revolution from below" by giving the Terror an anti-bureaucratic and plebeian thrust (J.A. Getty, Gabor Rittersporn). 70 As one analysis of the victims reveals, the Terror was directed, in the first place, at elites, and, with some support from "below", against local potentates in particular. 71 Future research could address the question to what degree this narrow scope for action precluded deviant behaviour. Did the adoption of Stalinist argumentation patterns influence or change personality at its core, the self? A question which seems all the more relevant considering the hypothesis that Stalinism also intended to occupy that residual portion of the self from which an oppositional stance could spring. That the imposition of Stalinist thought-patterns did not erase all vestiges of the developed self is confirmed by the actions of many critical communists who turned their backs on the movement. Despite the institutionalized, code-like language and formula permeating all documentation from the Comintern's Cadres Department, the autobiographies deposited there sometimes contain subtle phraseology which indicate that not every cadre adhered at all times to canonized communist standards. Having culled so much from this type of "secretized" biographical data, the next step is to probe the possibilities for the individual to retain his personality within a system which permitted only a schematized social identity in harmony with Stalinist norms. Western employees of the Comintern and political emigrants in the Soviet Union felt this dilemma acutely: they were expected to adjust to daily life in Russia, which was novel and only understandable with the passage of time, if ever. How did these foreigners come to terms with a society that did not recognize the division between public and private spheres, a basic characteristic of developed civil society in the West? Or how did communist women from abroad reconcile their commitment to equality between the sexes with the return to conservative family values in the Soviet Union after 1935?
It would be a pity to use the new archival material which offers so many insights into the world of the Communist International merely to supplement our factual knowledge. The historiography of the communist movement will only then reach a qualitatively higher plane when research is enriched with new questions, and approaches which widen the framework of previous research -the primacy of political history. In addressing the following themes, historical research on the Comintern will cease to be the preserve of specialists:
• how public and private spheres in society were delineated; • how identity was "constructed" in the Soviet version of modern society; • how gender difference and gender identity were generated.
By integrating these and similar themes of contemporary social history, the findings of communist history can be made accessible to a larger audience than just the small circle of specialists. Due to the rich primary sources now available, a comprehensive "historicization" of the Stalin era is now feasible, provided, of course, that the archival rules of access in Russia do not deteriorate any further. There is no shortage of methods or approaches to make the subject comprehensible and interesting to groups terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859000114373 of scholars outside the small community of Comintern experts. In the last resort, it depends no longer on the archival deposits but on the historians themselves whether or not Comintern history remains a happy hunting ground for the few.
